Though the evolution of prisons and the prison system in medieval Europe is a welldeveloped field in the history of law, little attention has been paid to prisons and incarceration on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. The present study makes use of archival and literary sources in order to examine how prisons functioned in Venice's most important colony, the island of Crete. As there has been no previous study of prisons and incarceration in medieval Greece, the article's first aim is to establish some basic facts about the prisons of Crete, such as their locations, their organisation and their system of administration. More importantly however, the study investigates the role that incarceration played in the legal system of the Venetian colony and attempts to set this role within the context of the juridical developments of the Late Middle Ages. Of particular interest is the question of how closely the legal system of the Venetian colony followed the judicial practice of the metropolis and whether it was influenced by the pre-existing legal institutions of Byzantium. Finally, the study also examines how the jurisprudence of the colonial regime dealt with offenders of different ethnic background and legal status.
complete restitution to the injured party.
14 Incarceration for violent crime is virtually unknown; instead, criminals are punished according to a system of tariffs ranging from simple fines to corporal punishments (including mutilation and blinding) and death. The singular exception occurs in the case of convicted rapists who are to be imprisoned for eight days, until they pay their victims a sum equal to their dowry. Failure to do this within eight days would result in the rapist's blinding. 15 Again, therefore, incarceration is not the actual penalty for the crime, but a means of coercing the offender to make restitution.
Despite all this, it is evident that Venetian law allowed tacitly for incarceration to be used as a penalty. There are two indications of this, within the statutes themselves. The law considered a criminal case proven, only in the event where the accused was proven guilty by confession or by the testimony of witnesses. If these conditions obtained, then the judges were required to pronounce sentence according to the system of tariffs stipulated by the statutes. However, failure to prove the case by confession or witnesses did not necessarily mean that the accused was acquitted and released. If the judges remained convinced of his or her guilt, they were allowed to convict and pronounce a sentence according to their own conscience. 16 This sentence would presumably be lighter than the full penalty stipulated by the law, and might therefore include incarceration. Similarly, the final chapter (29) of the Liber Promissionis Maleficii stipulates that, since only a finite number of crimes could be listed in the law code, the punishment for all other crimes was left at the discretion of the judges. 17 That these 'loopholes' resulted in the imposition of penal incarceration becomes evident from a revision of the law on the discretion of judges, enacted in 1329. Here, it is stipulated that in cases of robbery and pillaging that remain unproven by witnesses or confession, the sentences imposed at the discretion of the judges should not include incarceration, but should be limited to corporal punishments. 18 This cursory examination of the Venetian statutes shows that at the time of their codification in the thirteenth century, the laws of Venice did not envision incarceration as a punishment. Certain crimes resulted in the incarceration of the offender, but only as a means of enforcing the actual penalty, usually the payment of a fine. The prisons, of course, also served for the detention of those awaiting trial. By the fourteenth century, however, penal incarceration had become much more common, partly as a result of the discretion allowed to judges in sentencing criminals. This was sometimes seen as an abuse, or as undue mitigation of the correct penalties, and legislation was therefore enacted to counteract the process.
The judges certainly continued to pass sentences of incarceration, especially for lesser crimes, not covered in the statutes. A single famous example may illustrate the point here. In 1388, the son of Doge Antonio Venier (r. 1382--1400) was sentenced to two months' imprisonment and a fine, for writing scurrilous and abusive graffiti on the house of a Venetian noble. 19 Out of respect for the laws, Antonio Venier did not grant his son pardon, but allowed him to go to prison. This personal experience may have resulted in a piece of legislation promulgated by the dDoge in 1391, aiming at the reform of the prison system. The document is one of our most important sources for the organizsation and living conditions of medieval Venetian prisons. 20 Much has been written about both these topics, which cannot be discussed but in the broadest of terms here: 21 having grown organically, rather than by design, the prisons of Venice did not come under the jurisdiction of a single governmental department, but pertained to several different councils and offices. 22 As is well known, the main prisons were situated inside the Ppalazzo Dducale (namely, the Pozzi and the Piombi), but various smaller sites existed in the city's sestieri; these functioned mainly as jails, for the detention of minor offenders overnight or for the detention of those awaiting trial. 23 Living conditions varied widely for the inmates. This was a standard feature of many medieval prisons, because prisoners were often required to pay for their own upkeep, though in Venice the state provided basic subsistence for all prisoners. This meant of course that wealthier inmates were allowed a higher standard of living, with better food and more respectable living quarters. 24 In Venice in particular, at least after Antonio Venier's reforms of 1391, the prison population was supposed to be segregated according to the severity and nature of its crimes, so that prisoners for debt would not share space with murderers and other hardened criminals. 25 Certain prisoners were also allowed to exit their cells and move about the prison corridors, while others were even permitted to leave the prison on parole and return to their cells at night. 26 Conditions were much harsher for others, who were held in isolation and, usually, chained. It follows, that more serious crimes entailed harsher confinement, but the social status of the prisoner continued to affect his or her living conditions. It is stipulated, for example, in the reform legislation, that lower-class debtors might be held together with the violent criminals, segregation measures notwithstanding.
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The Byzantine background
Just as was the case in the West, Byzantine law did not provide for incarceration as a legal penalty. In fact, according to a glosser of Leo VI's Basilika, such penalties were forbidden. 28 In theory at least, prisons served strictly for the detention of those awaiting trial.
Convicted criminals were subjected to a range of different penalties, which included fines, corporal punishment (including various types of mutilation and blinding) and death. 29 It is worth noting that, though incarceration was theoretically prohibited, the law did provide for the confinement of certain criminals in monasteries, either as tonsured members of the monastic community, or as simple detainees. 30 This penal cloistering also existed in the West (though in a less institutionalizsed form), but is not expressly attested in Venetian legislation. 31 On the contrary, the penalty of exile, a form of confinement very widely used in
Roman and Byzantine law, was also extensively adopted by the Venetians.
Nonetheless it is certain that incarceration was also used as a penalty, though perhaps it was not a penalty that was regularly imposed by the courts. Bourdara has suggested that the penalty of incarceration was often applied to criminals found guilty of lèse majesté. The normal penalty for this crime was death, but on occasion this was commuted to imprisonment. She also points out that the only authority competent to judge such a crime was the emperor himself. 32 It would appear therefore that penal imprisonment was at times imposed by the emperors as a commuted, lighter punishment for those who had in some way opposed his authority. The poet Michael Glykas, who was imprisoned during the reign of Manuel I Comnenus, wrote that he was held together with criminals condemned for treason, sedition, forgery of the royal signature, murder, blasphemy, and theft. 33 The first three of these crimes could easily fall into the category of lèse majesté. However, Tthe inclusion in the list of murder, blasphemy, and theft, however, into the list, shows that a similar process of mitigating penalties must have taken place for more mundane crimes as well.
Furthermore, it appears that at times prisons were also used for the detention of debtors. Though the laws did not expressly prescribe prison sentences for debt, the Byzantine historian Pachymeres (1242-c.1310) attests that the penalty was used against those burdened by public debt. 34 This was obviously a coercive measure, similar to the ones employed by the Venetian Republic to force debtors to pay, but with two important differences: these imprisonments do not seem to have been expressly sanctioned by the law as was the case in Venice; they seem rather to have been, once again, the prerogative of the emperor himself.
Furthermore, Pachymeres states clearly that only public debtors were confined. In Venice, by contrast, the state imposed such penalties on private debtors as well as public ones.
Cecaumenus (c.1020/24-c.1078) also offers a similar testimony of imprisonment for public debt in his Strategikon. He relates the story of a tax-collector who fell into debt and was subsequently sent to the poorhouse. It is evident though that this poorhouse was in actual fact a prison, where the tax-collector spent his days chained to the stocks inside a dark cell. 35 It is evident from the above, that incarceration for a variety of offencses was employed in Byzantium, despite the absence of relevant legislation. Whether these penalties were imposed abusively, that is to say in contravention of the law, is unclear. It seems more likely that, by and large, these were mitigated penalties imposed for serious crimes, instead of death or mutilation and, perhaps, at the discretion of the emperor himself.
Prison sentences in Venetian Crete
As was the case in Venice herself, Roman (i.e., Byzantine) law was formally excluded from the jurisprudence of the Venetian colony of Crete. The sources of law for the colony have been preserved in the oath sworn by the island's judges, which list four such sources in ranked order. 36 First and foremost were the statutes of Venice. If a case was not covered by the statutes, then the judge ought to proceed judging de simili ad simile. Failing this, he should follow good custom, and if no custom existed he should judge the case according to his conscience. 37 To these sources, we should add two more that are often encountered in our material: the various ordinances emanating from Venice relating to the colonies, which were dispatched to the competent authorities in Crete; and the ordinances promulgated by the colonial authorities on the island, referred to sometimes as ordines terre. 38 These ordinances (especially those coming from Venice) could overrule any existing legislation. The jurisprudence of Venetian Crete, therefore, was based on the laws and governmental acts of Venice, the acts of the government in Candia, and established precedent. Despite, however, the heavy dependence on the laws of Venice, which very rarely prescribed prison sentences, incarceration seems to have been very regularly applied in Crete.
In the mid-fourteenth century, there existed four prisons in Crete. 39 Of these, our sources mention two by name, both situated in Candia: one is referred to as carcer castelli or carcer forte castelli or simply as castellum and the other as carcer ponentis. The prominence of these two prisons in our sources makes it clear that these they were the island's main prisons. The third one must have been the women's prison founded in Candia after 1314
(discussed below). The last one remains unidentified. It may have also been in Candia, though there is some evidence to suggest it was situated in the town of Chanea. 40 That three,
-or perhaps all four -of the island's prisons were located in the capital, is not surprising, for it is there that most trials were held. Evidence of this can be seen in the capitularies of captains and castellans of the island. These local officials, who had jurisdiction over territories outside of Candia, were allowed to try cases, but only those that warranted relatively modest pecuniary sentences of up to twenty-five hyperpera. Those accused of more serious crimes had to be transported under guard to Candia, where they would be tried and punished.
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The location of only one of the afore-mentioned prisons can be determined with any certainty: the carcer castelli was located in the fort known as Castellum Communis, or simply as Castellum, which the Venetians had built as part of the city's maritime fortifications in the thirteenth century. The fort, built for the defence of the port, was located at the tip of the western breakwater. vulnerable. Yet it would appear that the law was not in step with social developments resulting in the criminalizsation and incarceration of an increasing number of individuals who were not unwilling to pay but had simply become insolvent.
We may be sure that this became a significant issue, because it attracted the attention of the metropolitan authorities in Venice on several occasions: iIn 1384 and again in 1400 the government of Crete was ordered by the Venetian Senate to facilitate the payment of debts, for the benefit of impoverished debtors who were abandoning the island. In the second instance, it was said that many debtors, fearing prison, not only fled Crete but found refuge aboard Turkish ships and served as guides in raids against Venetian lands. 50 The matter had preoccupied the local authorities as early as 1347: from that time onwards, the government repeatedly proclaimed that debtors who had fled the island on account of debt convictions could return freely and would be given the opportunity to set up payment plans with their creditors under favourable terms. 51 None of these efforts appears to have solved the problem, and Venice had to intervene again, in 1411: on this occasion, once more, the Venetian Senate stated explicitly that many debtors who were unable to pay their debts were fleeing the island out of fear of imprisonment. Because this was detrimental to the colony, the duke of Candia was ordered to offer these people extensions on the payment of their debts. 52 All of the above presents us with clear evidence that incarceration for debt was becoming increasingly commonplace, though at times it was certainly counterproductive. The very concept of incarceration for debt might seem counterproductive, as imprisoned debtors, unable to exercise their professions, would find it even harder to raise the required money.
Fortunately, two court cases from the late fourteenth century illustrate how the process could work. In 1389, Maria Rodena was imprisoned for a private debt of twenty hyperpera. Unable to pay, she petitioned the court and succeeded in making her own debtors liable to pay the debt. 53 In a similar, though much more expensive, case Philippus Piçamano had been imprisoned for a public debt of 3,000 hyperpera. He subsequently petitioned the court to seek part of the money from his own debtors. Despite the fact that the court acceded to his request, Philippus escaped from prison and went on the run. His wife then petitioned the court to recognizse her as the creditor of her husband's debtors so that she might proceed to pay off the debt. 54 These two cases illustrate first of all how easily one could become insolvent. Both the debtors in question were unable to pay their debts, even though they themselves were clearly owed money which they had not been able to collect. Once imprisoned, however, they were able to pass on liability for their debt to their own debtors. Collection of these second debts would then presumably become the business of the courts, and the original debtors would be set free. 55 Of course in these two cases, the imprisoned debtors were fortunate, because even though they were insolvent, they were not destitute; they had assets, in the form of debtors, which they were able to put towards the payment of the money they owed. Others would have been less fortunate and would have had to spend indefinite periods of time in prison with little hope of paying off their debts.
Another category of prisoners consisted of those who were imprisoned for failure to pay a fine. It is not clear whether any failure to pay a fine would result in imprisonment, but certain sentences did include this stipulation. In 1320, for instance, it was declared that any nobleman or person of authority who became involved in, and influenced, disputes among the clergy would be liable to pay a fine of 100 hyperpera, or go to prison for a year. 56 Similarly, any who drew arms within a church, would have to pay 200 hyperpera or spend two years in prison. 57 The more serious the offence, the higher the fine was and the longer the prison sentence that failure to pay would incur. In fact there seems to have existed a relatively common tariff: fines of 50 hyperpera incurred sentences of six months; one hundred hyperpera incurred sentences of a year; and two hundred hyperpera incurred sentences of two years. 58 This 'tariff', of course, was not universally applicable. In December 1338, for example, the government of Crete issued a prohibition against Christian women serving as wet nurses for Jewish infants. Among the penalties proclaimed for the Jewish employers was a 200-hyperpera fine, or a prison sentence of one year. 59 All of this was completely in step with contemporary juridical developments in Venice, where the relationship between fines and punitive incarceration had already been firmly established by the early fourteenth century. In fact, by 1303, a formal calculus had been devised in Venice, by which pecuniary sentences were converted to prison sentences. According to this calculus, failure to pay fines of twenty-five pounds incurred a sentence of six months in prison, fines between twenty-five and 50 fifty pounds incurred prison sentences of nine months and fines between 50 fifty and 100 one hundred pounds incurred sentences of a year. 60 Although I am not aware of a similar calculus having been formally established in Crete, it is evident that this Venetian practice was transplanted to the island almost verbatim, albeit with some modifications to the amounts and their resultant prison sentences.
There are certain similarities between this category of prisoners and the defaulting debtors mentioned above; most obviously that they were both imprisoned essentially over pecuniary matters. There is also, however, a very important difference: the prison sentences referred to here were not coercive in the same sense as those employed against defaulting debtors. They were certainly aimed at persuading offenders to pay their fines, but once the offender had defaulted, he or she were imprisoned not indefinitely, but for a set period of time. In other words, release was not necessarily dependant on payment of dues. Nonetheless, one may detect the same process at work here as in the category examined above; namely, the increased use of incarceration for offences that in the past may have not warranted a prison sentence.
More serious crimes could result in both a fine and a prison sentence. Thus, those who contravened the government's prohibition against smuggling serfs and slaves off the island in their boats, would be liable to both fines and incarceration. Moreover, in cases like this, the prison sentence would not officially start until after the offender had paid off the fine. Such was the case of Georgius Flascomagulo, who in 1341 was found guilty of transporting men to Palatia without permission. He was sentenced to a fine of one hundred hyperpera and three months in prison. By July, he had already spent four months in prisonconfinement, but though his prison sentence had not officially started, because he had yet to pay his fine. 61 Iohannes Argiro, in the early fifteenth century was even more unfortunate: he had been sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 150 hyperpera. By 1403 he had already spent two years in prison but his sentence had not yet started because he was destitute and could not afford to pay the fine. Eventually, fearing that he would die in prison, the authorities recognizsed the two years as time served, and allowed him to get out ofleave prison on parole and beg for money with which to pay the fine. 62 It is noteworthy that amongst those convicted to similar sentences, we encounter several individuals found guilty of low-level violence. The Venetian statutes stipulated that those guilty of simple assault were liable to pay two fines, one to the state and one to the victim; those attacking with a sword and causing bloodshed would pay no less than twentyfive pounds to the victim, while if they killed their victim, they would face capital punishment. Assaults that took place under any other conditions were left to the discretion of the judges. 63 In Candia the judges seem to have favoured prison sentences as a supplement to fines, for attacks that were not serious enough to warrant corporal punishment. Thus, for example, the Greek monk Caçucana was sentenced to three months in prison and a fine of 100 hyperpera in 1364, for striking G. Dimiterello and causing a fray in the piazza. 64 Likewise, Marcus Truno was sentenced to a 50-hyperpera fine and three months in prison for injuring Iohannes Sclavo. 65 A more puzzling case is that of Guilelmus Sanudo, who in 1346, was found guilty of assisting his brother in abducting a woman. His brother subsequently attempted to rape the woman, and in the struggle ended up killing her. For his role in the crime, Guilelmus was sentenced to a fine of 50 hyperpera and a year in the lower prison. 66 Though a year in the lower prison was certainly not an enviable prospect, the sentence seems relatively light in view of the seriousness gravity of the crime. All three elements of this crime were treated as very serious by Venetian law: abduction on its own could warrant a prison sentence, while rapists could be blinded and murderers ought to be hanged. Guilelmus had only participated in the woman's abduction and had not been present at the murder, but
Venetian law recognizsed joint culpability for accomplices in criminal acts, and thus one would expect a much harder penalty. 67 Be that as it may, what it is once again evident, is that, when allowed discretion in the exercise of their duties, the judges of Candia supplemented the penalties stipulated in the Venetian statutes with sentences of incarceration.
Imprisonment was also used as a supplement to sentences of exile, which were very common, especially as punishment for some violent crimes. 68 In such cases, the offenders were either sentenced to a period in prison followed by exile, or simply threatened that if they broke the terms of their exile they would be thrown in prison, and then subsequently banished once more. 69 In addition to all these cases, many other crimes that are difficult to categorizse were occasionally punished by imprisonment. Those are, perhaps, the most interesting, because despite their diversity many of them are essentially offences against the state. Those range from trivial cases of perjury, to corruption of public officials and even cases of sedition.
Cases of corruption were dealt with severely, both in Venice and in Crete. In the midfifteenth century a number of high-ranking officials from Crete (including the duke and his councillors) were found guilty of corruption and maladministration of public money, and were punished with significant prison sentences in Venice, deprivation of all offices, exile and astronomical fines. 70 In Crete, a Greek priest who had forged a charter was sentenced to a year in prison, if he presented himself willingly, or a year in prison followed by perpetual exile if he tried to avoid his punishment. 71 Even thus, he should count himself lucky, for another forger, the notary Michaletus Justiniani, who had been found guilty of falsifying documents, was paraded through the streets with the forged documents hanging from his neck, had his right hand cut off and his eyes plucked out, and then was banished from the island. 72 Venice was famously harsh with those who defied her authority, and few who openly rebelled could hope to escape with their lives. It is worth remembering that after the uprising Revolt of Saint Titus (1363-8), even the sons of the leading rebels, many of whom were infants at the time, were punished with deprivation of political rights and property, as well as by exile. 73 Prison sentences were also employed against rebels, especially if they had not been amongst the leaders. Significantly, cases such as these were amongst the few which warranted perpetual imprisonment, a sentence abhorred by both Roman and communal law alike. The sons of Ioannes Kallergis, for example, who had acted under the command of their father during the Saint Titus rebellion, were sentenced to life imprisonment in Venice. 74 Similarly, the sons of Vardas Kallergis and one of the Siphopouloi, whose fathers had rebelled in 1333, were spending prison sentences in Candia but managed to escape in 1341. 75 Another Kallergis, Costas, had been sentenced to prison for ceding the castle of Kissamos to the rebels (probably during the Saint Titus revolt). In 1377 he appealed, claiming that he had had no choice but to surrender the castle, prompting a re-examination of his case in Venice. 76 Then there were those whose involvement with sedition was entirely peripheral, or perhaps simply suspected rather than proven. Thus, around the time of the said revolt of St Titus, we encounter a spate of incarcerations for offenders who had uttered 'verba inhonesta coram dominio' or 'verba contra bonum statum huius terre'. 77 These vague expressions refer to utterances made against the Republic or in support of the rebels, as is proven by a letter addressed by the Comune to Venice, in November 1364. 78 That these offences must have amounted to little more than off-hand remarks is shown by the case of Leonardus Dellaporta, who, prison sentence notwithstanding, went on to have a bright diplomatic career as a faithful subject of the Republic. 79 It is worth noting here, that the rebels had also resorted to incarcerating their political opponents during the brief period they held power in Candia. A number of notable loyalists thus found themselves imprisoned in 1363, including the rectors of Chanea and Rethymno, and even the bishop of Corone, who had come to the island as a mediator. One of the most fanatical of the rebels had even tried to set fire to the prisons in order to burn the loyalist prisoners inside. 80 Other crimes that threatened the colony's status quo, though less overtly, were also punishable by imprrisonment. Venice had long feared, for example, the subversive influence of the Greek clergy -, especially monks -, and had sought to limit their influx into the island.
In 1349 and again in 1350 the authorities decreed that any Greek monks that tried to enter
Crete would be imprisoned for six months and subsequently deported. 81 Another decree of 1349 shows one of the ways in which the Greek clergy subverted authority: it was said that many Greek monasteries harboured escaped slaves (presumably by taking them in as monks), believing that this pleases God. Any members of the Greek clergy found doing this would be incarcerated for six months. 82 Prison was also threatened to those who endangered Venice's interests, for example, by exporting war materials to Muslim lands, or by exporting goods for which a state monopoly existed. 83 Finally, those liable for service in the fleet who failed to present themselves when called up were also threatened with incarceration.
This brief review of prison sentences is by no means exhaustive, and many more offences punishable by incarceration may be found in the surviving sources; but nevertheless, certain patterns begin to emerge. It is obvious, for instance, that prison sentences were meted out a lot more frequently than Venetian legislation expressly dictated. This, of course was also the case in Venice and most other parts of Europe as well. Paradoxically, it seems that prison sentences were employed both as intensifiers for relatively soft penalties and as a mitigant alternatives for much harsher ones. We have seen for example that cases of assault were sometimes punished with both a fine and incarceration, rather than the simple fine prescribed by the Venetian statutes. Equally, those selling watered-down wine were threatened with a month's imprisonment, despite the fact that no such penalty was stipulated in the statutes for falsifying merchandise. 84 On the other hand, however, we also encounter an accessory to abduction, rape and murder being punished by imprisonment, and even outright rebels sentenced to prison rather than death, presumably in recognition of extenuating circumstances. 85 These sentences all reflect the 'gap between legal theory and legislation' which Geltner has detected in Venice and other Italian cities, and which also became a feature of the Venetian colony's jurisprudence. 86 All of this certainly resulted in some serious discrepancies between the penalties inflicted on offenders and the severity of their respective crimes. Leaving aside some life terms imposed on certain rebels, most prison sentences, even for serious crimes, did not exceed two years. Yet at the same time, defaulting debtors might be held indefinitely, until they could repay their debt. Furthermore, wealthy offenders were often able to buy off their prison sentence, even if the sentence had not been incurred because of a debt or a fine. One of the ways to do this was by petitioning for pardon in return for providing a man to do galley service, for a period equal to the prison sentence. In other words, wealthy prisoners were allowed to buy their freedom, by simply hiring a mercenary for the government's fleet. In 1396, the Venetian Ssenate intervened and prohibited this practice, stating that it prevented the course of justice and offered no satisfaction to the criminals' victims. 87 All these things are side-effects of the process that took place at this time: the expansion of the prison system's remit to deal with a variety of different offences, apart from the onesthose expressly mentioned in the statutes. Violent crime was still punished predominantly by corporal or capital punishment, but other types of crime, especially those that threatened, or infringed on the rights of, the Comune were increasingly punished by incarceration.
The judges' freedom to exercise their discretion in sentencing played an important part in this process. As we have seen, this freedom was guaranteed (under conditions) both in the statutes and in the oaths that judges of Crete swore. In fact an event from the late fifteenth century illustrates explicitly the way in which judges contributed to the proliferation of prison sentences: in 1471 the Venetian Ssenate stated that the rectors of Chanea, Rethymnon, and Seteia, were in the habit of imposing short prison sentences in purely civil cases, thus making the cases appear criminal and making it harder for the defendants to appeal. 88 It is worth noting that even when this was revealed, the Ssenate did not try to put an end to this practice, but merely stipulated that the defendants should be given the right to appeal even if they had been sentenced to imprisonment.
Having examined the crimes for which one might be imprisoned, it is worth
considering what kind of people ended up in prison. Our evidence here is very fragmentary and not much can be stated with confidence, but certain broad conclusions can be drawn.
Firstly, it is evident that people from all walks of life, all classes, all religious groups and both sexes were represented in Candia's prisons. It is true that the upper classes had more opportunities to avoid prison, thanks to their ability to pay fines, but nevertheless we know of numerous nobles who were held in prison, not least for their part in various rebellions. On the other side of the social spectrum, we also know of members of the unfree classes being imprisoned. It is known, of course, that slaves and serfs accused of crimes were detained while awaiting trial, but there is evidence to suggest that masters had the right to imprison their slaves and serfs in state prisons without trial. 89 Thus, for example, two female slaves, named Maria and Rada, were said to be imprisoned in 1345 at the request of their masters. 90 Similarly, the serf Michael Quiriacopulo, who escaped from prison in 1348, had also been detained at his master's request. 91 It is also evident that in Candia members of all three major ethnic and religious groups (Greeks, Latins, and Jews) shared prison space in the prisons of Candia. Given the preponderance of Greeks on the island, it is likely that the Greeks would have also outnumbered the other two groups in the prisons as well, but there is no shortage of either of the three in the sources. No segregation of ethnicities and creeds seems to have taken place, as on several occasions prisoners from all these differentthree backgrounds were said to have escaped from prison together. 92 It is worth pointing out that amongst the Greek prisoners it is not uncommon to encounter priests and monks. This is because the Greek clergy of Crete (with the exception of 130 priests) came under the jurisdiction of the Venetian lay authorities, rather than that of the Latin archbishop. This state of affairs was blatantly uncanonical, but it was symptomatic of Venice's efforts to minimizse external influence (including the Latin Church's influence) over her territories. 93 Furthermore, because the Latin archbishop of the island was normally a Venetian citizen and a faithful subject of the Republic, these challenges to his authority went uncontested. As a result, the Greek clergy of Crete -, which should normally have been exempt of lay jurisdiction -, was tried by secular courts and punished just likewith the same measures as the laity. On the contrary, I have located no reference to Latin priests being imprisoned in the public prisons of Crete. That said, it is worth pointing out that even in Venice the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Grado and the bishop of Castello over their clergy was being gradually curbed, with the result that by the end of the fourteenth century, priests found guilty of serious offences were being imprisoned in the state's, rather than the episcopal, prison. 94 Finally, the Latin prison population of Candia also included non-Venetians, like such as the Genoese prisoner of war Andriolus de Travaria de Rapallo, who in 1350 escaped from the Hospitale Novum where he had been transferred in order to recover from illness. 95 It may be worth noting that many of the prisoners of medieval Candia would not have thought of themselves as criminals, nor would they be thought of as such by their contemporaries. The ease with which one might end up in prison, especially for debt, meant the stigma attached to such sentences was relatively insignificant. The case is amply illustrated by the example of Leonardus Dellaporta, who as we have seen achieved an admirable career in public office despite his incarceration in 1364, and to whom we shall return shortly. It is also demonstrated by the multitude of wills bequeathing money to prisoners, certain of which stipulate that the money should only benefit those who had been imprisoned for debt. This shows awareness of the fact that the legal system was fairly indiscriminate in its application of penalties, and recognition that not all inmates were equally deserving of charity. All this is in perfect accordance with recent research concerning debt imprisonment in Italy, where it has been stated that financial activity carried with it the risk of prison and this was recognizsed and accepted as a fact of life. 96 Despite this, however, it has to be said that, as far as Crete is concerned, the prospect of imprisonment remained a terrifying one for debtors. How else can one explain the fact that frequently debtors would abandon the island (presumably along with any hope for a decent and normal life) in order to avoid prison?
Organizsation of the prisons and living conditions
As we have seen, the prisons of Venice fell under the jurisdiction of various of the Republic's magistracies and offices, including, for example, the Council of Ten and the Council of Forty. The governmental system of Crete mimicked the structure of Venetian government, but in reality power was located in the hands of the duke and his two councillors, who were answerable directly to Venice. Below these positions there existed a multitude of public offices and magistracies, modelled on Venice's own, which were filled by the residents of Crete, either by election or by appointment. Certain offices were reserved for the noble feudatories of the island, while others were available to the cittadini and still others were available to the wider public. 97 Notices about the administration of the prisons, mainly appearing in the directives emanating from Venice, are extremely rare in our sources, but they illustrate some surprising departures from Venetian custom. Contrary to what was the case in Venetian prisons, where prisoners were not burdened with the cost of their own incarceration, it appears that prisoners in Crete had to shoulder at least part of this cost: in 1340 an embassy from the feudatories of Chanea unsuccessfully petitioned the Venetian Senate to reduce the amount payable by each inmate to a single grosso. 98 The document does not state how much prisoners were currently paying, nor does it offer any explanation as to the nature of this fee. It seems likely, however, that this was a one-off payment that inmates had to make upon imprisonment in order to offset the cost of their incarceration, as was the case in many Italian prisons. 99 Another innovation was instituted in June 1363, exactly a month before the outbreak of the rebellion Revolt of Saint Titus. At that time, the Venetian Senate ordered the government of Crete to lease the four prisons of Crete to private individuals, following a bidding process. 100 The proceeds from the lease would go into the public coffers. Presumably, the successful bidder would hope to make a profit from the fees paid by prisoners upon arrest, and from whatever other sums he could extract from them. 101 This attempted reform of prison administration was an unqualified disaster. In 1371 the Cretan government wrote to Venice informing the Senate that the private wardens were entirely unsuitable, and that because of their maladministration the prisons were in shambles, and murderers and debtors were breaking out on a daily basis. Moreover, that year's auctioning of the prisons had only earned the state the measly sum of 160 hyperpera. 102 The Senate, therefore, allowed the Cretan government to appoint public officials to oversee the private wardens.
A few years later, the plan was scrapped altogether, the prisons reverted to public administration, and two posts known as capitanei carcerum, i.e. (public prison wardens)
were created. A directive dating from 1392 instructs the government of Crete to advertise these two positions, one for the carcer castelli and one for the carcer ponentis. All candidates would have to register their interest with the chancery within eight days, at the end of which the committee which regulated the appointment of castellans and other officials would proceed to an election. 103 It is evident that these posts were among the lower public offices that were open to the general population of Candia.
The attempted -and ultimately unsuccessful --privatizsation of the prison system is of particular interest, for it represents a rare departure from customary Venetian practice, whereby the prisons were ruan directly by the state, and prisoners were not required to pay for their upkeep. The reasons that led to this experiment are not at all hard to divine: already from 1326 there had been grumblings from on the part of the Venetians of Crete, concerning the heavy taxation they were subjected to; 104 it was decided in Venice. Normally, low-ranking public officials were appointed by the local councils. In later centuries it appears that only two such guards existed, one for each of the main prisons. 106 Though the number seems very low, it should not surprise us, given the fact that in the fourteenth century the prisons of Italy only employed between three and eight guards in the fourteenth century, even though prison populations sometimes rose to several hundred inmates. 107 No other prison functionaries apart from the wardens and guards are mentioned in our sources. The small number of custodial staff may explain the frequency of prison break outs.
Escapes from prison were very common indeed, and reveal the inefficacy of the prison system. Even though incomplete, our sources attest to no fewer than seventeen breakouts in the years 1317 to 1352. 108 The situation deteriorated further after the unsuccessful privatizsation of the prison system in 1363. As we have seen, in 1371 the government asserted that prison escapes had become daily occurrences. Some of the breakouts were particularly eventful: in June 1328, for example, a perjurer convicted to six months in prison escaped after attacking and incapacitating the guard. 109 In July 1341 there was a prison break in which the sons of the rebels Vardas Kallergis, Costas Smerilio, and
Siphopoulos all managed to escape. 110 In October 1346 another rebel's son, Iohannes
Melissinos, escaped along with seven other inmates. 111 In 1350, in the most clichéd of escapes, a Genoese prisoner of war absconded from the hospital to which he had been transferred as he was convalescing from illness. 112 In August 1345, less than two months after a previous prison break, fourteen inmates made good their escape from the carcer castelli.
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In June 1338, four men disappeared from prison along with their prison guard. 114 Evidently assuming that the guard had been bribed, the authorities included him in the list of fugitives.
The most peculiar of prison escapes occurred in October 1348. It was alleged that a woman who was living with the guard of the carcer castelli took his prison keys in the night and opened the gates letting everybody out. 115 Wanting to find out Wishing to determine exactly what had happened, the government offered amnesty and a reward of ten hyperpera to Theodorus Malaspina (who had been imprisoned for debt), Michael Quiriacopulo (a serf imprisoned at the request of his master), and Dominicus (a soldier of the Castro Bonifacii) if they returned within five days to give testimony. This must have prompted the establishment of to impose new procedures for the safekeeping of the prison keys, for by 1392 the keys were no longer kept at the guards' houses overnight. Rather, the keys of the Castellum were taken to the residences of the councillors and those of the carcer ponentis were delivered to the ducal palace. At that time, however, the Venetian Ssenate wrote to the Cretan government that all keys should be taken to the residence of the duke at night. The duke would then appoint a suitable person to take the keys and do the nightly rounds, before returning them in the morning. 116 Even more problematic than the breakouts, were the escapes of prisoners during transportation to Candia. As has been mentioned, when local authorities captured wanted men in their jurisdiction, they were obliged to dispatch them to Candia to stand trial. Often, however, the detachments fell victim to raids by the prisoners' kinsfolk. Between 1321 and 1332, at least ten such raids, resulting in prisoner escapes, are attested. 117 It is worth noting that in all but two of these cases the prisoners and the raiders were Greek, and often identified as serfs. The accounts of these raids paint a vivid picture of the lawlessness of the island's countryside, which stood in stark contrast to the well-regulated urban environment. They also complement our picture of Greek civil disobedience against the Venetian authorities, which is already well-evidenced by the enthusiastic participation of the rural population in the rebellions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Clearly, the disenfranchised lower strata of Greek society put little stock by the Republic's judicial system, and thought little ofnot averse to resorting to violence against the authorities.
While tThe living conditions within the prisons were certainly unpleasant for all, they but must have varied widely. Unfortunately, several factors hinder our understanding of daily life within the prisons of Candia. Most importantly, the fact that the physical structures themselves have not survived makes it difficult to form any idea of the scale of the prisons and the size of the population they might have accommodated. Similarly, no account books or other registers concerning the prisons have been preserved, though such books were certainly kept at the time. 118 Despite these obvious shortcomings of our sources, we ought to assume that the prisons of Candia were considerably smaller than those of Venice and the other Italian cities. The different scale of the cities themselves is enough to convince us of this:
whereas before the Black Death Venice had an urban population of between 80,000 and 120,000 (and about 160,000 if we take into account the entire lagoon area), Candia's population may not have been larger than 10,000 (though the population of the entire island of Crete was probably around 150,000). 119 Although as we have seen criminals from the entire island were liable to be imprisoned in Candia, in practice the great majority of the prisons' population would have been culled frombelong to the city itself rather than to the rest of the island. A number of considerations point to this conclusion: firstly, only a minority of cases from the countryside were tried in Candia, for the local officials were allowed to try the minor cases in their own domains; added to this was the fact that, as mentioned above, escaping justice was altogether easier in the rural areas, where the accused could count on the support of kinsfolk and the inaccessibility of the terrain. Finally and most importantly, a great proportion of those imprisoned had been incarcerated for 'urban' offences', such as corruption or debt. With all this in mind, we may guess that the prison population of Candia could perhaps be counted in the dozens, rather than in the hundreds, as was the case in the Italian city-states.
Those under investigation or awaiting trial suffered greatly because torture was regularly and legitimately applied (usually in the form of the strappado) in order to obtain confessions. 120 Women were, in theory at least, more humanely treated by Venetian law, as is evidenced by a number of statutes that stipulate slightly more compassionate sentences for female offenders. 121 In practice, however, their questioning was occasionally horrific. 122 In 1314 an order from Venice stated that the female prisoners of Crete were detained in the castellum which was disreputable and unsuitable for women, and charged the duke with finding a new prison for them. 123 It is evident, therefore, that until 1314 female prisoners were detained in the same prison as the men. Their living conditions there must have been comparable to those of the men, with the added discomfort and dangers of being confined in close proximity to the male population. No information has survived concerning the new location of the women's prison, but it is assumed that this was the third of the four prisons attested in Crete by the mid-fourteenth century.
Conditions were also harsh for those prisoners who had been sentenced to incarceration in the 'lower' prison. The lower prison was a concept that existed in Italy and other parts of Europe as well, and which also had a classical antecedent. 124 The term obviously refers to a dungeon, though by this time the cells were not necessarily underground. In Venice, the more serious offenders were held in cells called le camerete, la Chatolda, and la Grandoina, situated on the ground floor of the Dducal Ppalace. 125 These cells were shared by numerous prisoners unless solitary confinement had been stipulated. 126 It is reasonable to assume that the same applied in Candia. Sentences to the lower prison are rare in the sources and are reserved for the worst of the offenders. This is surely an indication of how inhospitable this area of the prison was. Occasionally there are also sentences that stipulate that the prisoner ought to be chained while serving his sentence. 127 It is possible that these, too, were convictions to the lower prison. Only on a single occasion do we hear of a prisoner who succeeded in escaping from the lower prison. Among the scurrilous and humorous poems he wrote in prison, he composed a lament of his present condition, which has preserved much incidental information about the hardships of prison. 130 The physical space is described as a dark and filthy place which punishes the body just like purgatory punishes the soul. He complains about the stench, the absence of windows and the fleas and lice which he says are bigger than ants. His worst complaints, however, are reserved for the jailors, whose only concern, he claims, is the exaction of bribes from wealthy inmates, and whom he describes as crueller than the cynocephali. Upon first arriving at the prison, the inmates are treated harshly and are locked away for long periods; but this is only a ploy on the part of the jailors in order to scare the prisoners into offering bribes. The jailors follow the same tactics with regards to the inmate's family. When the family comes to visit, the jailors refuse to give them access, and pretend that the courts have ordered that the prisoner be detained in solitary confinement. Of course they soon allow visitations, once they have received their bribes. Every so often they would revert to their hostile behaviour, in order to remind the prisoner to continue the payments. It is clear from Sachlikes's account that he had his own private cell, in which he was locked at night. In the morning, the guard would arrive and unlock the door. Meals were served twice a day, seemingly inside the cell. Sachlikes's most bitter complaint is that his jailor joined him for all of his meals and, furthermore, ate most of his food. Not only that, but he also invited his friends (Germans and Lombards), who shared the meals, got drunk, and sang songs in their own language. This account of 'banquets' inside a private cell, with decent food as well as wine, shows that, as a well-to-do inmate, Sachlikes was paying for extra privileges, thus also attracting the unwelcome attention of the prison guard and his friends. 131 This would also explain the line 'ὅσα μὲ φυλακίσασιν, ὅσα δηνάρια χάνω', which suggests that prison was a continual drain on his resources. 132 Despite Sachlikes's many complaints about the physical discomforts of prison, it is clear that one of the most painful aspects of his incarceration was his loss of social status. In particular, he disdains the fact that his social inferiors (i.e., the guard and his companions) had authority over him and treated him condescendingly.
Even allowing for poetic licencse, Sachlikes offers valuable information about the everyday life of the convicts: we learn that prisoners (or at least some of them) were locked in private cells at night; that they received two meals pera day; that they were allowed visitors (provided the jailors did not block them); and that various outsiders were admitted into the prisons and even into the cells. We also get glimpses of the privileges that upper-class prisoners could enjoy (among which we must assume were the facilities and implements for writing) and of the cost -both material and psychological--at by which those privileges were purchased. 133 Despite Sachlikes' protestations about the conditions of his detention, it is hard to escape the impression that he was among the most privileged of his coeval prisoners.
Nevertheless, the incidental detail in his description of the jailor's avarice rings true; particularly so, considering that his imprisonment would have coincided with the period of the prisons' semi-privatizsation.
Sachlikes's younger contemporary, Leonardus Dellaporta, also a notable poet, was imprisoned not once, but twice. As we have seen, his first stint in prison was the result of some incautious words during the rebellion Revolt of Saint Titus. Both his career and his reputation recovered from this setback, and he was later appointed advocatus per omnes curias in Candia as well as an ambassador in important diplomatic missions. In his old age he was imprisoned for a second time, and spent his sentence writing the poems for which he is famous. 134 Unlike Sachlikes, he gives no information about life in prison, but what he says of his conviction exemplifies some of the points made above about prison sentences and their liberal application in conjunction with other penalties. His offence is not known, but it was the result of an amorous relationship with a woman. He states that he was falsely accused by her, and was dragged to court and unjustly condemned. He was sentenced to deprivation of public office, a fine to the state, child support for a child he did not believe to be his, and three months in prison. 135 Despite his bemoaning of the fact that the conviction humiliated and stigmatizsed him, after his release he achieved another position of relative prominence, as the lay prior of the hospital of Saint Lazarus. In western jurisprudence generally, the expansion of the prison-sentence's remit coincides with the mitigation and eventually the extinction of some of the harsher penalties. It therefore marks a move towards the more humane treatment of convicts. This process is particularly evident in Italy, and especially Venice and Florence, where it was facilitated by the wide-ranging powers afforded to the judges. 137 The situation in Crete accords perfectly with the increased use of penal incarceration, often in conjunction with fines, in fourteenthcentury Italy. The fact, however, that the system was still in transition resulted in some paradoxical and arguably unfair arrangements. Most obviously, it often predicated a longer sentence for defaulting debtors than actual wrongdoers. This, as we have seen, created serious disturbances in the life of the colony, forcing both the local and the metropolitan authorities to legislate in favour of insolvent debtors.
Moreover, the simultaneous use of fines and prison sentences was disproportionately burdensome to the lower classes. As we have seen, such sentences stipulated that the prison term would not officially begin until the offender had first paid the concomitant fine. This meant that those who could not afford the fine served much longer prison sentences than the wealthier convicts. Of course, the preferential treatment of the upper classes was by no means a novelty, and indeed it was in fact sanctioned by law. We have seen for example that certain offences incurred sentences that were graded according to the offender's social class and legal status. Though in theory all these punishments reflected the severity of the crime, in practice they were far lighter for the nobility than they were for the lower classes. 138 In addition to these 'legitimate' discrepancies in sentencing, various abuses also favoured the upper classes at the expense of the lower ones. The clearest example of this is the practice of allowing wealthy convicts to buy their freedom by hiring mercenaries to serve in the fleet for the duration of their sentence. Even by the standards of the day this was seen as unjust, and the practice was terminated by order of the Venetian Ssenate.
All ethnic groups were represented in the prisons of Candia, so it is clear that ethnicity in itself was not a factor in the imposition of prison sentences. However, the unequal treatment of the different social classes would have meant that the Greek population, much of which was servile or semi-free, was more vulnerable not just to incarceration, but to harsher penalties in general. There is evidence, for example, to suggest that slaves and serfs could be imprisoned in state prisons merely at the request of their owners, without a trial. Whether this resulted in a higher percentage of Greeks among the prison population cannot be ascertained.
Even if that was were indeed the case, it would have been only natural, given that the Greeks vastly outnumbered the Latins on the island. The one instance in which the Greeks are much more conspicuous than the Latins with regards to imprisonment, is in the raids carried out against government officials transporting prisoners to Candia. It is worth noting that most of the prisoners in question were both lower class (usually serfs) and accused of serious crimes (i.e., murder or robbery). Moreover, they would have been tried in an area far from their own homes, where they would essentially be strangers. Consequently, they would have been facing penalties much harsher than imprisonment, and would have had very little hope of acquittal. Under these such conditions it is not difficult to see why their families would have opted for such extreme measures. These events must be seen as acts of civil disobedience by the most disenfranchised segment of the population, and moreover the one segment treated most harshly by the legal system. This legal system emerges as entirely consistent with Wwestern developments in jurisprudence. Though it cannot be denied that Byzantine traditions survived on the island of Crete, especially with regards to laws on land and agriculture, as far as the penal code was concerned, the one major influence was the judicial practice of Venice. 139 Of course, similarities with Byzantium's penal codes are not at all hard to find (notably in the incarceration of debtors), but these have to be ascribed to the common origins of Byzantine and Venetian law, rather than to any survival of Byzantine juridical practice on the island of Crete. In fact, the evidence concerning incarceration in Crete demonstrates not only the primacy of the Venetian statutes in the legal affairs of Crete, but also the continuity of current practice from the courts of Venice to those of Crete. For although the statutes reflect the Venetian legal theory of the early thirteenth century, with its still limited use of penal incarceration, the evidence from fourteenth-century Crete reflects perfectly the legal practice of Venice in the fourteenth century. Going backTo return to the issue of the sources of law for the colony, and the thorny matter of 'custom' and 'precedent', we may be certain that, as far as penal affairs were concerned, the only custom and precedent that mattered was that of
Venice and not that of the Byzantine past. Moreover, the biennial appointment of high officials from Venice ensured that the latest Venetian precedents were taken into account in the court cases of Crete, with little or no lag between the juridical developments of the colony and those of the metropolis.
It was remarked at the beginning of this essay that a different set of circumstances obtained in medieval Greece than those that had led to the evolution of the prison system in wWestern Europe, with regards to legal tradition and political and religious authority. Given this fact, one may perhaps be surprised to find such close correspondence between the juridical developments of Venice and her colony, despite the local peculiarities of Crete. Yet, ironically, it may have been just these peculiarities that led to the strict adherence to the Venetian model: the insecurity of the Venetian regime in Crete, the high proportion of Greeks among the population, the lawlessness of the countryside and the frequent rebellions (on one occasion even by the Venetian colonists) all led to an almost paranoid preoccupation with the maintenance of the rule of law and the upholding of the status quo. Under these conditions the Venetians were ill-inclined to experiment with matters pertaining to law and order, though they were much more flexible in other areas (notably the administration of land, where they adopted and adapted both Wwestern, non-Venetian, and Greek models). 41 Gerland, Das Archiv, 101 and 103. There is abundant evidence that these rules were observed. In fact, the transportation of prisoners to Candia was a very dangerous business: the sources are replete with instances in which the prisoners' kinsfolk ambushed and often killed the armed escort, in order to free the prisoners. This topic shall be further discussed below. 42 For a description of this fortress and its history, see Tzompanaki, Χάνδακας, 135--41, and Georgopoulou, Venice's Mediterranean Colonies, 51--52 and 92. The fact that the original structure was destroyed and a new one built over it means that much information about the organizsation of the prisons has been irretrievably lost. Most importantly, it is impossible to tell how extensive the prisons were and, consequently, how large a population they could accommodate. 43 Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Duca di Candia, Bandi e Proclami, 14, fol. 210v. 44 Santschi, 'Procès crminels', 83. 45 Santschi, 'Procès crminels', 82--96, and 'Affaires pénales', 80. Torture was also used extensively in interrogations in Venice, provided that all six of the Signori di Notte gave their permission and at least two of them were present at the interrogation. See Dunbabin, Captivity and Imprisonment, 127.
46 ASV, Duca di Candia, Bandi e Proclami, 14, fol. 215v. 47 McKee, Wills, 1:30. Note that the document refers to prisoners in the plural, indicating that the twenty-five hyperpera were intended to secure the release of more than a single debtor. 48 McKee, Wills, 1:345. 49 Estimating the actual value of medieval currencies is notoriously hard, and it is even harder in the case of medieval Greece, where a variety of different moneys with fluctuating relative values were used. Roughly speaking, in the fourteenth century a Cretan hyperperon was worth half a Venetian ducat, though this value fluctuated significantly. The hyperperon's value however was fixed at 12 Venetian grossi. The best introduction to the complex issue of Veneto-Cretan currency is Vincent, 'Money and coinage in Venetian Crete'; see in particular pages 285--85; see also Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange, 287, and Charalambos Gasparis, 'Οι επαγγελματίες του Χάνδακα', 87. In order to form an idea of what a debt of five hyperpera (≈sixty grossi) actually amounted to, we can compare it to the wages of various of Crete's workers and the prices of various goods. In 1351, the daily wages of carpenters were four and a half grossi, of bricklayers three and a half grossi and of caulkers five grossi. A debt of sixty grossi, therefore would amount to around half a month's wages of a skilled manual labourer. More sought-after manual workers could earn much higher wages. For example, blacksmiths who could shoe horses were offered annual wages of 150 hyperpera (≈1800 grossi) by the government. Non-manual workers earned even higher wages. The notary Dominicus Grimani, for example, was paid 10 hyperpera (≈120 grossi), for composing a single will in 1356. See Tsougarakis, 'The Documents of Dominicus Grimani', 253. Around the same time, a large gardening hoe was worth seven grossi and a pair of shears four grossi. For the workers' wages and the prices of tools see Gasparis, 'Οι επαγγελματίες του Χάνδακα', 107 and 110. See also ASV, Notai di Candia, b. 103, fol. 7v. 50 Theotokes, Αποφάσεις, 161--62 and Theotokes, Θεσπίσματα της Βενετικής Γερουσίας, 2:253--54.
